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Abstract The power grid is undergoing a major change
due mainly to the increase penetration of renewables
and novel digital instruments in the hands of the end
users that help to monitor and shift their loads. Such
transformation is only possible with the coupling of
an ICT (Information and Communication Technology)
infrastructure to the existing power distribution grid.
Given the scale and the interoperability requirements
of such future system, Service-Oriented Architectures
(SOAs) are seen as one of the reference models and are
considered already in many of the proposed standards
for the smart grid (e.g., IEC-62325 and OASIS eMIX).
Beyond the technical issues of what the service-oriented
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architectures of the smart grid will look like, there is a
pressing question about what the added value for the
end-user could be. Clearly, the operators need to guar-
antee availability and security of supply, but why should
the end users care?
In this paper, we explore a scenario in which the
end-users can both consume and produce small quanti-
ties of energy and can trade these quantities in an open
and deregulated market. For the trading they delegate
software agents that can fully interoperate and interact
with one another thus taking advantage of the SOA.
In particular, the agents have strategies, inspired from
game theory, to take advantage of a service-oriented
smart grid market and give profit to their delegators,
while implicitly helping balancing the power grid. The
proposal is implemented with simulated agents and in-
teraction with existing web services. To show the ad-
vantage of the agent with strategies, we compare our
approach with the “base” agent one by means of simu-
lations, highlighting the advantages of the proposal.
Keywords Agents · Smart Grid · Energy Market
1 Introduction
The way in which electricity is produced and distributed
appears to be rapidly changing. If in the past the pro-
duction was centralized and the distribution was hier-
archical, with the advent of renewable generation facil-
ities at all scales, thus also for small scale, one notices a
trend towards decentralization of production and multi-
directional power flows. Potentially, anybody connected
to the smart grid can produce and consume energy. Two
major aspects make this situation appealing for the end
users: one, being able to save electricity costs and gain
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2 Nicola Capodieci et al.
an economic benefit from installing production facili-
ties; two, the feeling of being sustainable. The first of
these two aspects will be realized if the users are able
to operate in a free market where they can choose to
purchase energy from several energy providers, not nec-
essarily large utility companies and if they are at the
same time able to participate in such a market as sell-
ers. The feasibility of creating such a market relies on
a rich digital infrastructure capable of measuring and
controlling energy flows, which are central points of the
current shift towards the concept of a Smart Energy
Grid.
The creation of open energy markets at the level
of the end-users poses compelling technological chal-
lenges. In fact, the scenario is very decentralized, since
each house holder could produce, negotiate and use en-
ergy in an autonomous way. Moreover, it is highly dy-
namic, since the price and the availability of the en-
ergy can change even every hour or more frequently,
for instance depending on weather conditions. Finally,
it will be large-scale or even extreme-scale, since energy
companies can serve a wide geographical area with a
large number of users and the power grid is becoming
a wide international infrastructure. All these expected
high level requirement hint at service-orientation as the
enabling ICT pattern for the infrastructure and indeed
the current standardization effort are going in the di-
rection of service orientation, as we have overviewed
in [35]. Service-oriented systems couple nicely with agent
modeling. One is concerned with the interoperability
while the other allows to take advantage of the auton-
omy to build loosely coupled scalable systems, such as
smart grids [41].
1.1 A changing energy landscape: the Smart Grid
The term Smart Grid is a new concept that has not a
final and unique definition yet, rather the various ac-
tors of the energy panorama (e.g., power producers, end
users, energy distributors, and energy markets) have
their own definition of the Smart Grid and each sees
the challenges and the benefits of this new electricity
system [31]. Although there is no clear and single def-
inition, some aspects and benefits of the future elec-
tricity systems can be envisioned following the view of
the U.S. Department of Energy (cf. [32] and [33]). The
new Grid will be able to diagnose itself and take appro-
priate action in case of faults, therefore it will become
more resistant to willing and unwilling attacks and dis-
asters. Another key feature will be the ability of the
Grid to accommodate more renewable-based sources of
power. This last aspect is particularly challenging since
renewable sources introduce substantial variability and
unpredictability in the energy system, and it puts the
system under stress. Last but not least, the end user:
he will have an electrical system that has the same or
even improved power quality and reliability meeting his
needs and expectations; in addition, the user expects,
of course, to have cheaper energy bills in a grid that is
smarter.
One of the key issues of the whole power system is
the necessity to keep the whole energy system in bal-
ance. With the term balance we mean that there should
always be a null balance in the energy injected in the
Grid and the energy withdrawn from it (considering
losses too); otherwise imbalances provoke failure in the
equipment and lead to blackout cascading effects [14].
In a future energy scenario, with an energy mix charac-
terized by an higher penetration of renewable sources
the balancing issues related to the Grid are even more
worrying. One of the ideas to help in shaping the de-
mand according to the energy availability is dynamic
pricing [19]. The concept of dynamic pricing is that the
price of electricity will vary considerably during the day,
thus influencing the users to use more (or less) their
electric devices.
Another pillar of the future Smart Grid is the dis-
tributed generation of energy. Energy will not be gen-
erated only in multi-megawatt power plants (as it has
been done since the early days of Edison and Insull),
but with more affordable and cheaper small-scale gen-
erating resources (e.g., photovoltaic panels, small wind
turbines) the end user becomes a producer of energy
too. To define this new figure on the energy scenario
that is no more a passive customer, but who is also
a small producer, the term prosumer (small producer
and consumer at the same time) has been created. It
is not hard to imagine that the prosumer will be able
to feed the surplus of energy into the Grid (that is al-
ready possible nowadays) and to participate in an auc-
tion market where energy is traded in a manner similar
to commodities on the stock market. Actually, the ten-
dencies in the energy market that enable more compet-
itiveness in the sector (i.e., unbundling [39]) might lead
to totally free energy market where every consumer,
prosumer and traditional generating company will be
allowed to participate [48].
1.2 Smart Grid frameworks
Several frameworks to illustrate the stakeholders and
components of the future Smart Grid have been pro-
posed. There is not a unique standard, though a num-
ber of these have emerged among others, such as the
GTM (Green Tech Media) [27] and the NIST (National
Institute of Standards and Technology) ones [34]. The
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Fig. 1 GTM (above) and NIST (below) Smart Grid conceptual frameworks. Yellow ovals highlight where the present work
fits in.
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Smart Grid vision and proposal that we set out here
fit with the key findings of [27]. In fact, our application
covers five aspects of the twentyfive elements essential
in the realization of the Smart Grid in the whole power
domain as outlined by the GTM framework. In partic-
ular, our application goes in the direction of reducing
the costs for producing and consuming energy for pro-
ducers and prosumers/consumers. Further, the archi-
tecture and the application realized are tangible exam-
ples of how it is possible to develop new services and
business cases by using the new smart grid use-cases
and the well-known and flexible software approach of
SOAs. This last aspect is perfectly in line with the find-
ing of Leeds [27]: “Many of the advanced applications of
Smart Grid are expected to develop in an evolutionary
manner based on current technologies available and the
needs of the market.” Further, our application interacts
with a real smart meter device to gather real consump-
tion, therefore ready to a real industrial context and
exploring the scenario close to dynamic pricing of en-
ergy for the end user. Our application targets mainly
the consumer side of the power layer interacting with
smart metering technologies. As communication layer,
we take advantage of TCP/IP protocol over LAN for
the inter-agent communication; an ad-hoc protocol con-
verter that translates from the NTA8130 Dutch stan-
dard into TCP/IP has been used for the interaction
with the smart meter. Therefore, at the application
level, we satisfy the use cases concerning the smart me-
ter reading and the realization of a distributed energy
trading between energy utilities, prosumers, and con-
sumers. We cover therefore in different ways the whole
stack presented by GTM.
Considering the NIST framework [34], we also cover
several parts of the information flow and application
domain proposed cf. Figure 1. The solution here pre-
sented covers aspects of the user domain and the me-
tering of his consumption together with the interfac-
ing to energy services that in our specific case is en-
ergy trading. We cover the whole market stack of ser-
vices/communication interacting also with traditional
energy producers and a simplified form of operation
controller that monitors the stability aspects of the net-
work.
Figure 1 shows the high levels Smart Grid market
taxonomy of GTM and the reference diagram of NIST
information flows in the Smart Grid context, respec-
tively. The yellow oval shades represent which areas are
covered from the application presented in this paper.
1.3 Contribution and organization
Given the complexity of the future smart grid scenario,
appropriate approaches are required. Multi-Agent Sys-
tems have appropriate features to face it and can take
advantage of decentralized software architectures such
as service-oriented ones [38]. However, even if agents
can show some sort of adaptivity, the complexity of the
scenario requires an explicit design of the system adap-
tation [52]. This can lead not only to a better adap-
tation feature, but also to results that better suit the
expectations of the involved actors.
The contribution of this paper is to present a service-
oriented agent-based system to manage deregulated en-
ergy markets. We show that the adoption of an adaptive
strategy in such open environments can lead to meet the
prices expected by involved actors better than the situ-
ation where agents have the bare autonomy feature. In
addition, our approach turns out to pay more attention
to the environment, since renewable sources of energy
are better exploited than in an non-adaptive situation.
We have implemented the proposed system using Jade,
a wide-spread agent platform [3]. In JADE, agents reg-
ister their capabilities as “services” available to other
agents.
Moreover, the proposed system can be inserted in
an “ecosystem” of services (see Fig.2), where agents
provide services but at the same time exploit other ser-
vices in order to take more grounded decisions; as an
illustrative example, our system exploits weather fore-
cast web services to know the future weather and infer
how it will influence the production of energy. Then, we
have compared our adaptive approach with the “basic”
behavior of a system of autonomous software compo-
nents without our proposed adaptive strategy. The re-
sults show that the prices of the energy in our approach
better suit the price expected by the actors involved in
the average case. The presented SOA architecture relies
on an ecosystem of services in which agents are situated
and able to interact with their surrounding context: the
agents are able to obtain relevant information (such as
weather conditions) and indirectly influence the same
ecosystem by dynamically changing their role in the en-
ergy e-market. These changes are triggered according to
their energy consumption needs or small scale energy
production (in case of Prosumer agents). Non-trivial
interactions between agents and their surrounding en-
vironment have already been subject of investigation
on the point of view of formal modeling [20].
The paper substantially extends and systematizes
our previous workshop and conference contributions [10,
9]. In comparison with the conference versions, in this
paper we introduced the work with more details, pro-
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Fig. 2 Ecosystem of services
viding deeper motivations; from the content point of
view, we focus on the exploitation of Service Oriented
Architectures in this multi-agent system application;
moreover, we discarded technological issues to focus on
the strategies and advantages of the proposal; we signifi-
cantly expanded the related work discussion, to provide
more background for our work.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First,
we describe the software components of the proposed
system, along with their roles and their behaviors (Sec-
tion 2). Then, we present the adaptive trading strategy
that is based on game theory, detailing the adaptive be-
havior of the whole system (Section 3). In Section 4 we
sketch the implementation of our system. We exploited
this implementation to simulate real cases of deregu-
lated energy market; the comparison between a base
behavior of agents and the application of our strategy
is presented in Section 5. Finally, after presenting some
related work (Section 6), Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Software Components Modeling
Several software components, or agents, are involved in
the considered energy trading scenario; in this section,
we describe them and we point out a clear distinction
between how an agent is supposed to act in a real envi-
ronment and what it actually performs in the simula-
tion software, in order to achieve a better understanding
of the problem. The agents involved in our application
play different roles. The main and auxiliary agents are
explained in Subsection 2.1, while balancing issues are
discussed in Subsection 2.2.
2.1 Agents
Buyers represent energy consumers and their number
is usually larger than the one of the sellers; they do
not produce energy so they are searching for obtaining
their electricity demand supplied by stipulating con-
tracts related to a specific time interval. Each market
day is divided into several time intervals and for each
one every buyer has to decide in advance who is going
to be its energy supplier for the next time interval. In
the developed software, a balancer agent controls the
amount of energy exchanged in the negotiation process
(the details are explained later in this section). Buyers
can have an estimation about how much energy they
will need in the following time interval. This can be ob-
tained by reading previous electric measurement and by
applying an energy consumption forecasting algorithm.
It is important to perform this forecast before any nego-
tiation, so that the buyer can choose the most suitable
seller according to the energy availability of the sup-
pliers. A really effective forecasting algorithm that fits
our short-term paradigm is thoroughly described in [16]
and it is based on an adaptive two-stage hybrid network
with a Self-Organized Map (SOM). Every buyer is in
competition with other buyers: each consumer has the
goal to stipulate the cheapest contracts following two
actions:
1. Attending an auction handled by prosumers, con-
sisting of an iterative process of sending sealed bids.
2. Contacting a big energy producer (Genco, energy
Generator company) in order to obtain the cheap-
est short-term contract before the Genco reaches a
congestion threshold of its production lines.
Prosumers represent actors that both produce and
consume energy; prosumers are supposed to be more
than Gencos, but they produce a smaller quantity of
electricity compared to traditional supplier. Their pro-
duction relies on the use of solar panels or wind tur-
bines; when the amount of produced energy is higher
than their domestic needs, they can sell the surplus of
electricity to other buyers, in particular neighbors. Pro-
sumers can exploit information about weather condi-
tions (for instance, by querying existing web services)
in order to make a forecast on the amount of energy
that will be produced.
In our scenario, a buyer can stipulate a contract
with a prosumer after winning an auction round, based
on sealed bids. Any positive amount derived by selling
energy can contribute to prosumer ’s investment return,
once the investment in a small-scale energy production
plant based on renewables is realized. In order to be at-
tractive, prosumers’ starting prices must be lower than
Gencos’ initial contract prices. So, prosumers commu-
nicate to buyers an initial starting price that takes into
account the contract costs of Distribution System Op-
erators/Transmission System Operators (DSOs/TSOs)
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
6 Nicola Capodieci et al.
and a specific cost due to the devices used to produce
electricity (e.g., maintenance costs). The energy pro-
duced by a prosumer has to be sold and cannot be
stored or buffered. Every prosumer is in direct compe-
tition with other sellers: they have to propose an ap-
pealing starting price and make an intelligent use of
refusing bids in order to rise the price and, at the same
time, avoid pushing buyers in contacting other sellers.
Gencos represent big energy generating companies. In
principle, they can supply an infinite amount of energy,
but they sell energy at a fixed price, so there is no ne-
gotiation with buyers and every contract can be stipu-
lated much faster compared to the prosumers’ auction
system.
The drawback is that their prices are higher than
prosumers’ starting price and they depend not only on
DSO/TSO contracts, but also on raw material prices
and (most important in our scenario) threshold exceed-
ing costs. This aspect is thoroughly explained in the fol-
lowing paragraph and represents a modeling choice to
prevent overloading production lines as well as avoid-
ing concentrating a huge number of consumers for a
single big producer. A Genco receives a request from
a buyer; then it just calculates the price according to
the above-explained aspects and communicates the fi-
nal price back to the buyer.
Usually, energy companies can produce a given amount
of energy; but if the demand is higher than this amount,
they have to buy the missing quantity on the market
(e.g., a foreign and more expensive market) or to switch
to more expensive and polluting production units. Thus
we assume that every Genco has a supply threshold,
and once reached, its production is “under stress” and
it has to buy energy abroad. So the energy cost can be
calculated as follows:
Cu =
{
Costenergy if below supply threshold
Costenergy + (EC ×A) otherwise
(1)
where Cu is a single energy unit cost, EC > 1 is an ex-
ternal cost constant and A > 0 is the number of energy
units above the threshold.
We remark that exceeding the threshold, besides
being expensive, can also be harmful for the environ-
ment since more polluting plants must be started (e.g.,
oil based). Asking the Genco for contracts when this
threshold is already exceeded leads to more expensive
contract prices for consumers. The more energy demand
is beyond the threshold, the more prices rise. This par-
ticular pricing strategy already introduced in [11] is per-
fectly compliant with the findings of other researches:
from the already cited [40] and [50] to older studies led
by Brazier et al. [4]. These researches do not provide
the same formulation, however the common conclusion
Fig. 3 Agent model
is that satisfying large number of demands will stress
energy production lines introducing additional costs for
the final user.
The Balancer and the Time agents are introduced as
auxiliary agents, not directly involved in the negotia-
tion process but useful to support the system activi-
ties. The Time agent has the only duty of providing
a time reference for synchronizing processes, while the
Balancer agent is in charge of the demand/supply bal-
ancing aspects: it acts in the very first step of the ne-
gotiation round by retrieving the single demand of ev-
ery consumer and the production forecasts of the pro-
sumers. Fig. 3 reports a simplified model of the agents,
exploiting the AUML notation.
2.2 Balancing
A clear understanding of the balancing needs of the grid
is a crucial aspect. Recent studies show how the nation-
wide energy dispatch will react to the introduction of
renewable sources [5]; in particular, the energy produc-
tion derived from traditional sources will decrease: in
the U.S.A a future projection of four summer days in
year 2030 is depicted in Fig. 4 and shows two scenar-
ios, with and without solar penetration and how their
percentage of produced energy compares to traditional
sources. The demand satisfied by the total production
from all sources remains constant in these two scenar-
ios; however, in (b) we can see that the introduction
of PV and CSPs (respectively PhotoVoltaic and Con-
centrating Solar Power plants) will cause decreasing in
production by all the traditional suppliers.
The data in Fig. 4 refers to GridView1 production
cost model, with hourly load, solar and wind projections
for 2030 based on 2006 information to maintain data
correlation. On a separate note, it is important to point
1 http://www.abb.com/industries/
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Fig. 4 U.S. Nationwide energy dispatch without (a) and with
(b) renewable contributions. Source [5]
out that, in Fig. 4, solar plants have production peaks
during central hours of the examined days.
In our model we are dealing with situation (b) when
it comes to balancing issues. Several mathematical mod-
els have been proposed, but most of them are simply
ways to set to zero the algebrical sum between demand
on one side and supply to the other side [47], which
appears to be insufficient for taking into account the
rising number of renewable installations.
We provide a model which captures the salient fea-
tures of the energy paradigm of the near future. Con-
sider:
Gcx as Genco X with SGcx being the supplies provided
by that specific Genco
Ng number of Gencos
Pry as Prosumer y with SPry being the supplies pro-
vided by that specific Prosumer
Mp number of Prosumers
Dt total demand of the observed Area and Time Inter-
val with DCtk the demand of the K
th buyer
Ti time interval i
Ct number of consumers in the observed Area and Time
Interval
Consider also that the capability of producing an amount
of energy is influenced mostly by the market of raw
materials for the Genco production line, while the pro-
sumers have to deal with local weather. Producing more
than the quantity that they are supposed to supply
is risky for the sellers since we assume the absence
of buffering or storing of surplus energy. Moreover, we
have to take into account all the previous considerations
regarding traditional suppliers versus PVs and CSPs.
Demand D is calculated by a specific algorithm of
demand forecasting, but no matter which kind of statis-
tics we are going to use in order to solve that, we have
to specify that the demand refers to a pre-determined
interval of time. That is because we are trying to deal
Fig. 5 Message topology between peers. Source [26,7]
with the short term market paradigm in order to avoid
overloading electric lines as a result of bad long term
forecasting or unoptimized distribution.
Obviously D is just the sum of all the demands (at
a certain time) needed for all the consumers in the area.
The balance relationship in equation 2 has to be satis-
fied:
Ng∑
i=1
SGci +
Mp∑
j=1
SP rj =
Ct∑
k=1
DCtk (2)
Equation 2 does not take into account unavoidable leaks
and calculation errors. On the other side, if the sup-
ply and demand forecasting are efficient and precise
enough, we can rely on an easy implementation model
for simulations. Equation 2 is quite straightforward in
its meaning: the sum between the two production sources
(Gencos and prosumers) should be equal to the to-
tal consumer demand. Also, from previous sections, we
know that dealing with a fixed demand will cause the
other two elements to change accordingly and it is more
likely to see in the future an increment on the pro-
sumers’ supplies that will be balanced by a decrease of
Gencos’ production.
2.3 Components’ behavior
Consumers, prosumers, gencos and auxiliary agents can
be easily distributed among several areas and their mes-
saging topology is represented in Fig. 5: we can see that
consumers and sellers do not communicate with each
other, but they can exchange messages with all other
agents belonging the other categories. In Fig. 6 an ex-
ample message topology is shown.
Other agents used for simulation purposes are rep-
resented by an Agent Creator which is able to dispatch
the other agents in the corresponding areas [7] and an
exception handler agent used to increase performances,
which has been implemented during scalability and re-
liability tests [26].
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Fig. 6 Example of contract and messaging net between
agents scattered in a distributed environment. Source [26]
In Fig. 7, we will present an overview of the be-
haviour that agents exhibit during a single negotiating
round, in order to provide a clearer picture on how the
contract negotiation and the adaptation to the energy
market has been modelled.
The time line shown in Fig. 7 completely describes
what happens during a single negotiating round. Some
behaviors are common, such as the discovery of agents
according to the role they have: this is obtained using
a feature of the chosen agent platform. In fact, JADE
has a distributed Directory Facilitator (DF) in which
any agent can register itself to be then found by other
agents distributed elsewhere, therefore the DF acts as
a yellow pages service. Registration in the DF is done
just once in the initializing method for balancers and
consumers, while the search and discovery is done in ev-
ery negotiating interval as the prosumer agent decides
to register itself as a seller or buyer according to its
prediction of energy production. This latter choice ob-
viously introduces more computational load, however
it is completely justified for having a dynamic architec-
ture in which the number of total peers is constantly
changing, both at the level of numbers and roles.
The first step is to retrieve information by means of
web services for both consumers and sellers.
The goal of the former ones is to obtain the local
temperature to know in advance if an air conditioning
system will be active: the function that relates tempera-
ture with consumption can be roughly described as a V-
shaped function: to lower and higher temperatures (rep-
resented in the X-axis) correspond to higher energy con-
sumption measures (represented on the Y-axis), while
for average temperatures (19 to 21 celsius degrees) the
energy consumption is minimized (see Fig. 8).
An agent can retrieve temperature values using ap-
propriate web services (e.g., NOAA weather web ser-
vice or OpenWeatherMap) and a prosumer does the
same for obtaining weather information for forecasting
its production (e.g., wind direction and strength in case
it has a micro generation through wind turbine). More
details regarding these topics will be provided in Sec-
tion 2.4.
A buyer can also retrieve information about previ-
ous consumptions and on-going tariffs by interacting
with the services provided by a Smart Meter (a new
generation electric energy consumption reader), in the
starting steps. This has been previously and success-
fully tested with the presented implementation in [11].
Concerning the buyer’s market strategy and adap-
tation to the dynamics of the short term electricity con-
tracts, in Fig. 7, we can see how the agents’ decisions are
taken in several steps: as soon as they have received the
notification from the balancer to start the negotiation,
they have to first decide to contact either a prosumer
or a Genco. This is done by using a minority game de-
rived algorithm (see Section 3.2), taking into account
the limited prosumers supplies compared to the tradi-
tional Gencos. In case of the choice of contacting a pro-
sumer, also the amount of stakes and maximum number
of sent bids follow the adaptation algorithm: the goal
is to avoid wasting time in sending multiple bids while
Gencos are exceeding their production threshold. The
market adaptation deals with the last step: every con-
sumer has to evaluate if his budget expectations have
been respected, changing how to rise their bids accord-
ingly to the previous negotiation outcomes. This latter
step is obtained by an added fuzzy logic block Fig. 9.
2.4 External Web Services
As mentioned, different kinds of agents need different
kinds of services. The consumer agent can take better
decisions if it knows the future consumption. The en-
ergy profile is built taking into consideration different
parameters; the external temperature has been pointed
out as one of the important factor when dealing with
demand forecast [30,17]. The producers need accurate
forecasting of wind (in case of WT owner) or solar ir-
radiance (in case of PV unit).
Table 1 shows the existing web services investigated
for our case scenario (wunderground2, HC3vX3 and
NWX4). As can be seen, web services differ from type
of input, services provided and granularity of data. Due
to the scarce granularity of the NWX web service, we
used the data provided by the first two.
In the following we sketch the mathematical and
physical relationships between the external factors (ob-
tained via web services) and the constructional char-
2 www.wunderground.com/history/
3 www.soda-is.com
4 www.navlost.eu
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Fig. 7 Steps in the behavior of the main agents involved in the negotiation and balancing aspects.
Table 1 Investigated web services
Service name Ser. provided Intervals Input
wunderground Wind speed and hourly Location
direction;
temperature
HC3vX Solar irradiance hourly Location
or coordinates
NWX Wind speed and six hours Coordinates
direction;
temperature
acterization of producers’ renewable energy production
devices, since they have specific constructional param-
eters. In a hypothetical applied scenario, these param-
eters can be soft coded in the smart meter (or in a
middleware device situated between the agent platform
and the consumption reader): it is important that this
information is known in advance and is compliant to
any changes of the devices installation.
2.4.1 Wind Power Production
The production of electrical power through wind tur-
bines depends on the interaction between the rotor blades
and the wind speed; in particular, the electric power
generated by a wind turbine (Pe), expressed in watt,
can be determined through the eq. 3:
Pe = ηe × ηm × Cp × 1
2
× ρ×A×Ws3 (3)
Where: ηe is the efficiency of the electric generator,
ηm the efficiency of the mechanical components, Cp is
the power coefficient, A the area swept by the rotor [m2
], ρ is the air density [kg/m2] and Ws is the wind speed
[m/s].
The Ws is the wind speed and this is a parameter
obtained by requesting a Web service, providing the
location of the place where the wind turbines are in-
stalled.
Cp,max = 0.59 is commonly called Betz Limit and
expresses the following basic idea: “The maximum power
that can be theoretically extracted, considering an air
flow and an ideal wind turbine, may not exceed the 59%
of the available power of the incident wind”. In practice,
there are in fact three effects that are able to decrease
the maximum power coefficient:
– Rotation of wake behind the rotor;
– Finite number of blades;
– Aerodynamic resistance.
With modern turbines, however, reaching a Cp ∼=
0.5 value represents a good approximation for the the-
oretical Betz Limit.
In our model, the Cp of different producers are ran-
domly selected with values ranging from 0.3 to 0.5 in
order to simulate the characteristics of the various wind
turbines present in the market. The Cp so determined
does not only represents the fraction of power that the
wind transmits to the rotor, but, for sake of simplicity,
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also includes other factors that influence the operation
of the wind turbine such as, for example, the roughness
of the ground or the installation height [1]. The air den-
sity depends on the temperature and the altitude of the
place of installation, which can be easily obtained from
a meteorological Web service; the performance parame-
ters are constructional features of the turbine. The last
parameter represents the speed of the wind, which is
known thanks to the web service exploitation.
2.4.2 Solar Power Production
To calculate the energy that can be produced by the
whole PV system, based on the data of average irradi-
ance in the considered time slot (3 hours), we exploit
the eq. 4, which refers to a single PV module. We sum
the single contributions of each installed module to ob-
tain the whole energy production of the installation.
Eg = P0 ×G×K × ηPV × ηINV (4)
Where: Po is the module peak power [Wp], G the
solar irradiation [W/m2], K the shading factor, ηPV
for the PV generator efficiency, ηINV is the inverter
efficiency.
The solar irradiation [W/m2] is obtained by the Web
service, again providing the location/coordinates of the
place where the modules are installed.
The inverter efficiency range is between 0.88 and
0.94, while the efficiency of the photovoltaic generator
has a range from 0.70 to 0.86 and depends on several
factors such as the ambient temperature: a higher tem-
perature could decrease the module efficiency. In [21]
K represents a parameter (usually K < 1) that takes
into account the phenomena of power reduction for ag-
ing, panels’ inclination, shadowing and foliage due to
nearby trees. For our level of abstraction, K is chosen
with a randomized values varying from 0.8 to 0.95 in
order to better represent the analyzed scenario. Po is a
characteristic parameter of the modules, so also in this
case, the variation of the electricity production will de-
pend on the weather conditions: solar irradiance is one
of the parameter retrieved from the Web services.
2.4.3 Consumers’ demand trend over time
The consumption of electricity is affected by different
factors such as day of the week or holidays, climatic
variables, seasonality and economic activity. When try-
ing to predict the energy consumption in the short
term we can consider most of these factors known via
user profiling. In this model, they are treated as ran-
dom variables in a plausible range according to typical
trends.
In order to obtain some typical values regarding
daily energy consumption, we took inspiration from pre-
viously stored data (source: www.terna.it). This infor-
mation is then integrated with our model for bounding
consumption and temperature (will be explained later
in this section), creating a consumer model that takes
into account both the energy profiling and the temper-
ature impact.
The influence of external temperature is crucial be-
cause sudden changes in temperature will cause signif-
icant changes in consumption in the short term, while
the other profile-related factors are supposed to follow
a more static trend.
The relationship between temperature and consump-
tion is non-linear and dynamic: we adopt an approach
taken from the literature [6] and explained later; other
approaches propose similar functions with different tem-
perature thresholds.
The temperature versus consumption function is de-
scribed by the followings:
– The relationship is a combination of linear func-
tions, with knots (key values) in 8◦C, 18◦C, 22◦C
and 32◦C. There is an interval of temperatures be-
tween 18◦C and 22◦C, where the temperature does
not affect consumption; the temperatures below 20◦C
shape the cold zone (use of air conditioning) and
temperatures above 24◦C the heat zone (use of elec-
tric heating). Those areas are shown in Fig. 8 and
they cause maximum consumption values;
– The cold zone can be approximated via two linear
decreasing functions. The first one presents temper-
ature values between 8◦C and 18◦C. To tempera-
tures below 8◦C the slope of the function decreases
in absolute value, still maintaining the linear trend.
Further attempt to cool down the environment are
supposed to be inefficient;
– In the heat zone there is a similar relationship. There
is a linear response function between 22◦C and 32◦C;
above 32◦C the slope presents a smaller value, so
that the marginal effect of temperatures above 32◦C
is lower than temperatures between 22◦C and 32◦C.
Just as in the cold zone, this last slope change is
forced by the electric heating device used.
Again, the external temperature is achieved by means
of a Web service.
2.5 Agents meet SOA in the Smart Grid
In [36], we defined the characteristics that the new Smart
Grid environments demand in terms of service orienta-
tion to fully implement the features that the Smart Grid
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Fig. 8 Temperature vs. consumption: A: cold zone, B: no
effect on consumption and C: heat zone
will enable. These are interoperability, scalability, dis-
covery, mobility, resilience to failure and trust, service
integration and composition, topology, smart metering,
and real-time. To position the current work, we look
at the same characteristics from an agent-oriented per-
spective and report the fitting in Table 2. The table
shows the features of SOA and agents considered in the
application presented here.
3 Energy Trading Strategies
When dealing with a fairly complex market model like
the one described in the previous sections, the require-
ment of autonomicity of the entire system imposes the
need of designing algorithms for agents so to enable
them to maximize the probability of reaching certain
goals. The complexity and dynamism of the market
model proposed, however, forces the consumer agents
to deal with a certain degree of uncertainty and unpre-
dictability regarding other agents decisions.
A common trend in dealing with such uncertainties
is to adopt a game theoretic approach for modeling the
processes and mechanisms.
As pointed out in the survey by Fadlullah et al.
about several game theoretic approaches to the smart
grid, the notion of Nash equilibrium is constantly in-
volved in these models: finding a Nash Equilibrium means
finding a particular strategy, if it exists, that each agent
has no interest in changing, independently of which
strategies other agents choose [15]. By no means this
is a violation of the rationale of the agent: if we think
about the famous prisoners dilemma [42], we realize
how the Nash equilibrium is not the right strategy to
follow in order to let a single agent (or limited number
of agents) win the specific round by letting the oth-
ers (loser agents) paying the consequences, but it is a
strategy aimed to loss minimization in the worst cases.
Table 2 SOA and agent technology for the Smart Grid
Feature Description
Interoperation Web service technologies are used
to achieve interoperation between
different elements of the proposed
solution. Environmental conditions
of the locations where the en-
ergy trading operated are obtained
through Web services; the smart me-
ter provides too a web based service
(thanks to an ad-hoc realized hard-
ware gateway); agents interact with
Web service to provide their position
for geo-location purposes.
Scalability The agent technology and the en-
abling platform (JADE) allows na-
tively the scalability of the solution.
More experimental details are given
in Section 5.
Discovery Both the involved Web services used
and the agent platform have discov-
ery services that ease the implemen-
tation.
Mobility In the use case of this application
we do not consider the mobility of
the agents, but JADE allows agents
to migrate from one context to an-
other. Such functionality might be
useful for scenarios such as mobile
prosumers (e.g., electric vehicles).
Resilience to
failure, trust
and security
In this paper the trust and security
problem is not directly addressed,
however we exploit the related fea-
tures of JADE-S (a security exten-
sion to JADE platform) as explained
in [7]. The resilience to failure of the
solution is tested in the additional
test cases available in [26].
Service inte-
gration and
composition
The solution itself provide integra-
tion of different services (weather,
location, energy trading).
Topology The topology issue is not taken into
account by the present solution how-
ever the costs of transporting elec-
tricity take into account this aspect
to a certain extent.
Smart meters The solution fully integrates the in-
teraction to a smart meter following
the Dutch standard NTA 8130.
Real-time The solution is not real-time, how-
ever the auction mechanism operates
in near real-time.
In [15], the authors show how classes of games can
be applied to a number of aspects of the smart grid,
while earlier works mainly focused on energy demand
estimation and load balancing. Other contributions deal
with adaptive micro-storage management, so to have
agents able to decide whether it is convenient for them
to store electric energy for later consumption as op-
posed to constantly participating in the electric energy
e-market [50]. We are mostly interested in the aspects
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regarding demand side pricing strategies: to this end,
we present our game theoretic approach to the smart
grid, which relies on the notion of minority game (Sec-
tion 3.1). The aim is, therefore, to study how agents
can autonomously decide the way they will address the
market so as to minimize the cost per obtained energy
unit. This is a similar approach to the one presented
in the work of Mohsenian-Rad et al. [29], in which the
considered smart grid allows the presence of a unique
Genco, while in our approach we consider a plurality
of Gencos, which is a more accurate model for future
smart grids. The difficulties in comparing the perfor-
mances of these different game-related approaches arise
from the fact that there is no unified tariffs model to be
adopted by smart grids: each work relies on different,
yet reasonable assumptions.
As far as classes of minority games are concerned,
minority or congestion games have been mainly stud-
ied as approaches to prevent net overloading: in [22] an
approach similar to the one we are presenting is pro-
posed, but no pricing or tariffs models are involved. In
our contribution, the minority game is used to provide
the agents with adaptive strategies for minimizing a
cost per energy unit that follow a pricing model that
relies on a SOA for updating prices and availability for
the different sellers during the negotiating rounds in
which we ideally split the market day.The iterated ne-
gotiating rounds can therefore be expressed in terms of
a repeated game as known from the game theoretic lit-
erature. In particular, each round or stage of the game
ends by assigning a reward to the participants. Seeing
the negotiation problem as a game implies translating
each goal for each category of agents into an utility :
from the consumer point of view, the utility function
(for each round related to the previous round) is min-
imizing the difference between an expected price and
the obtained price per single energy unit, while from
the producer point of view the goal of maximizing the
profits translates as minimizing the difference between
an expected profit and the price which they manage to
sold a single energy unit they produced. The amount
of such differences discriminates between winning and
losing situations. Once goals and utilities are defined,
the following step is to design algorithms and decisional
models for the agents involved, thus to define strategies
(as set of actions) for agents to perform in order to
satisfy the previously mentioned goals.
The relation between a minority or congestion game
and its related Nash equilibrium is extensively studied
in game theoretic literature [53,45], so in the following
sections we will exploit a common game and its equilib-
ria to then adapt this solution to our specific case study
by mapping all the variables of the examined game to
their respective counterparts in our Multi-Agent Sys-
tem.
The minority game which best fits the smart grid
agent negotiation process is the El Farol Bar game.A
recent variation of the El Farol Bar problem, called
the Kolkata Paise restaurant problem [12] was proposed
in order to study minority games characterized by a
macroscopically large number of possible strategies for
the participating agents: in our case, a future smart grid
will have a large number of agents involved, but each
agent will have a restricted amount of choices that are
related to either trying to stipulate a contract with a
prosumer or a Genco. Therefore, the traditional ver-
sion of the El Farol Bar game better suits our reference
model.
3.1 A Game for the energy negotiation problem
The “El Farol Bar” minority game [53] has important
similarities to the delocalized energy auction problem.
Here is an informal description of the game. The El
Farol Bar is a really existing bar situated in Santa Fe,
New Mexico (USA). Every Thursday night it delivers
Irish parties with discounted beer prices, becoming re-
ally appetizing for the local potential costumers. So ev-
ery person living near that bar, wants to go there in that
particular night. Formally, given a N population of the
nearby area, and a threshold T of people attending the
Irish night event, the night at the bar is considered as
enjoyable if the number n (≤ N) of people attending
it during a particular Thursday is below the threshold
T (win situation), otherwise it would have been better
for the single person to have stayed at home (lose sit-
uation, the pub is too crowded). This game belongs to
the so called minority game class of games: each agent
has the same set of actions to perform in each round
and the agents who choose the actions or set of actions
taken by the minority of the participants are likely to
expect higher rewards. In the specific El Farol case, in
Table 3 the payoff matrix for this game is shown.
The similarity with our problem are shown in this
two-paths way of thinking: if every agent would sign an
agreement with Gencos, it will result in overloading the
production lines of these big energy producers causing
them to supply in more expensive markets with higher
prices for the end-user and environmental issues too.
Likewise, if every agent contacts (or tries to do so) the
same restricted set of prosumers, only a small number
of participants could get a good deal, due to the fact
that prosumers can deliver variable percentages of en-
ergy and usually the total amount of this production
is extremely unlikely to cover the 100% of the total
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
An Agent-based System for Service-Oriented Smart Grids 13
demand [8]. Moreover relating to the bar game, partici-
pants are competitive and they are not able to commu-
nicate among them, so they cannot organize in order
to create shifts, in which they can split and chose (for
a fraction of them) not to go on this Thursday, but
instead go to the next one. Exactly like the El Farol
Bar game, in our energy negotiation problem, bidding
agents do not exchange information, so they have to
guess how other buyers are going to act.
In the bar dilemma, there are degrees of benefits and
penalties according to the result of each game round:
a participant gets the highest score by going to the
bar and he discovers that it is not crowded. He gets
a medium amount of points if he chooses to stay home,
and he gets a penalty (or the minimum score) in case he
chooses to attend the Irish night and finds it crowded.
In our problem, this score system can be replaced by
the difference between what a single agent was expect-
ing to spend and what he actually spends at the end of
the negotiation interval.
3.2 From El Farol to energy negotiation
For the bar game, plenty of studies have been conducted
in order to find a point of equilibrium; for the sake of
simplicity, we first analyze the most intuitive one (the
stage game solution) [53].
There is a unique symmetrical mixed strategy solu-
tion:
M − L
H − L =
T−1∑
m=0
(
N − 1
m
)
pm[1− p]N−1−m (5)
Where p is the probability to go at the bar and M ,L
and H the payoffs as shown in Table 3.
Different studies such as [53] and [18] have shown
other solutions as well. Especially, in [18], these ap-
proaches are reviewed according to metrics related fair-
ness and efficiency.
In the solution shown in Eq. (5), fairness expecta-
tions are met, but according to [18], the efficiency ratio
is low (around 50%). Other solutions proposed by the
just cited authors, suggest the use of fictitious plays in
order to propose a more efficient outcome over a sac-
rificed fairness. An approach that satisfies both fair-
ness and efficiency requirements is represented by a Q-
Learning strategy in which a central authority (e.g., a
major) introduces entrance fees for bar attending cos-
tumers to be distributed to the players who are staying
at home.
Table 4 Initial state 1
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact Pros. See tab3 (+2 Ip) See tab2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See tab4 (+1 Ip) See tab4 (+1 Ip)
Table 5 Initial state 2
Action P. has supplies P. has no supplies
Contact other P. See tab3 (+2 Ip) See tab2 (0 Ip)
Contact Genco See tab4 (+1 Ip) See tab4 (+1 Ip)
Table 6 Final state 3
Action Pros. accepts Pros. refuses
Place bid H Stay in tab3 (-1 Ip)
Abort negotiation - See tab2 (0 Ip)
Table 7 Final state 4
Action Genco above T. Genco below T.
Accept offer L M
Refuse offer Table 2(-1 Ip) Table 2(-1 Ip)
Focusing again on the energy problem, we have to
assign higher priorities to the fairness metric: our goal
is to define a peer to peer architecture in which, by defi-
nition, there is no space for discrimination between peer
agents. In addiction to that, the third (i.e. the central-
ized Q-Learning) solution provides a fair and efficient
way to approach the bar dilemma, but it increases com-
plexity with the concept of a central authority and in-
troducing fees that have no correspondence to our case.
Using Eq. (5), we can see that for each participant
we have a certain probability that can be used to deter-
mine whenever it is advisable to attend the Irish night.
Iterating the game stages we can see how every agent
sooner or later will attend the bar and that most of the
times, the pub will not be so crowded.
When trying to apply this solution to our problem,
we map some variables: T is the amount energy pro-
duced by a prosumer, N is the total consumers’ demand
and M, H and L are the intervals defined according to
the actual money spent by a consumer. The obtained
probability p becomes the basis for the buyer agents
decisions, that is, identifying whether it is convenient
to start contracting with a Genco or with a prosumer.
In addition, we also model the possible actions (thus
to define strategies) that the consumer agent can chose
to perform when the bids are refused or the contacted
prosumer does not have enough supplies to the respect
of the requested demand. The latter consideration im-
plies the need to see the game as divided in several
stages, thus to have four payoff matrices instead of one
(Tables 4, 5, 6 and 7).
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Table 3 El Farol Bar payoff matrix. With payoff score H > M > L, with M unconditioned.
Action Crowded Bar not Crowded Bar
Attend L H
Do not Attend M M
Tables 4 and 5 are called initial state tables while
tables 6 and 7 can be defined as final state tables. The
difference is that only tables 6 and 7 show an ending
of the negotiation that is symbolized with letters H,
M or L as the payoff entity inside those cells, while
the first two matrices show Intermediate Payoffs (Ips).
Therefore, we have:
– A multitude of agents representing a set of
players I;
– Players move through different tables shap-
ing the finite state space M = {TAB1, TAB2,
TAB3, TAB4};
– Each player (agent) i ∈ I is provided by
an action set Si(TABx) = {Contact Genco,
Contact Prosumer, Accept Offer, Refuse offer,
Place Bid};
– The risk accumulation when traveling from
current state A to next state (TABx) using
the action profile s ∈ Si , is described in Ta-
bles 4, 5, 6 and 7 with their assigned payoff
chains.
Every buyer starts by taking a decision in the first
table (as element of the state spaceM) . The balancer
agent is the entity that knows how much energy can be
produced by all the prosumers and by using this infor-
mation it can calculate a quantity that represents how
many buyers could be served by prosumers; this num-
ber can be related to the threshold T in the El Farol
game. According to that threshold, we can calculate the
consumer probability to chose to contact prosumers in-
stead of a Genco in this early stage of the negotiation
(quite similar on how it was possible to solve the “El
Farol Bar” dilemma using the unique mixed strategy
solution). However at this moment we do not have a
clear vision of future payoffs, but we can assign to those
initial tables, a certain amount of fictional points that
we call “intermediate payoffs”. These Ips represent the
chain of payoffs for this multiple stages game approach:
assuming that every action taken by a participant agent
is time consuming, decreasing Ips simulates time flow
as well as a risk increase that the participating agent
should be aware of. Risk aware in auction bidding sys-
tems have already been studied [43], although the con-
cept of risk is not elaborated in a multi-stage game,
it has to be specified that a risk aware agents better
simulates how a human user could act. On the other
side, higher Ips increase the chance to have a satisfac-
tory game result (H or M as final payoff). In this way
the buyer is redirected to other tables until it reaches
a final cell: doing so the number of Ips can increase
in case it is a lucky choice (e.g: contacting a prosumer
that for sure has enough supplies) or decrease in the
opposite scenario. In the initial state tables the buyer
is redirected to other tables according to a previously
calculated value that is related to the amount of energy
all prosumers can deliver. In the final state tables the
algorithm is different: in order to simulate the impor-
tance of the time variable, lower Ip values mean that
the buyer has been traveling around several tables for
such a long time and chances to find a suitable seller or
even a Genco that has not overtaken his threshold will
be scarce. That is because in the ending tables nega-
tive Ips values are present. When the Ip value is largely
below zero then the agent is forced to get a contract
with a Genco in order to avoid wasting other time (and
likely more money).
At the end of each round each buyer agent evalu-
ates the outcome of the previous round: this latter step
has to be done in order to foster adaptivity towards
the dynamic market variations. If a buyer agent ends a
round in a H final payoff but still the difference between
his expected price to spend per energy unit and what
he actually paid at the end of the negotiation is a large
negative value, this means that the agent was expecting
to spend an unrealistically low price, that is completely
unbounded to the real market trends (i.e: raw material
prices, peak production values, and so on). The agent
has then to rise his expected money to spend in or-
der to adapt to these market variations. The rising of
the expectation prices is proportional to the value of
the above mentioned difference: the larger is the differ-
ence, the stronger will be the agent reaction. Obviously,
the same but specular actions are taken in the opposite
case in which a consumer ends with a L final payoff,
but still his price expectation are met: this means that
the agent was expecting to spend much more than the
average real market price, therefore a decrease in these
expectations has to be operated.
Another possible buyer agents’ reaction is to vary
the amount of the single bid in case of bid refusals: small
increases in buyer’s bids could translate in longer nego-
tiations with prosumers, so to increase the probability
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Fig. 9 Fuzzy logic styled diagram for controlling bids.
Buyer’s side. 1) Increase expected money to spend 2) Rise
stakes/bids 3) Decrease Rise stakes/bid 4) Decrease expected
money to spend
that other buyers could reach an agreement with the
seller, while bigger increases will lead to faster agree-
ments, but at potentially higher prices. An additional
fuzzy styled block is shown in Fig. 9, helps the consumer
agent to find a balance between these two specular re-
actions. The graph is centered in the expected money
to spend. If the money spent is surpassing the right in-
terval, then the system reacts by slowly rising the stake
of every single bid and increasing the spending expec-
tations. On the other side, if the value for money spent
is located in the left side of the graph, the reactions will
be the contrary compared to the last situation: this is
done in order to adjust expectations in the case of low-
ering of market’s prices for electricity.
4 Implementation
In such complex and dynamic scenario, a simulation
is needed to prove if the designed strategy could be
used by agents to negotiate in the market, thus ob-
taining cheaper contract prices. In particular, we use
5 consumers, 3 prosumers and 2 Gencos within a 10
round negotiation runs to test the JADE agents imple-
mentation. This simpler scenario allows us to evaluate
the game based algorithm with more price scales us-
ing agents. The restricted number of agents, does not
compromise the purpose of the test: this is because the
kind of market modeled is more heavily influenced by
the ratio between total demand and prosumers’ supplies
rather than the number of agents per se. The simula-
tion setup uses a computer featuring an Intel Core 2 duo
processor (2.2 Ghz, 800 Mhz FSB) with 4 GB of RAM.
We used Windows 7 64 bit OS running JAVA SE 6
Update 21, using JADE agent platform v. 4.0.1.
To test the scalability of the system, we perform ad-
ditional experimentaiton with several JADE platforms
running and communicting concurrently. These simula-
tions go closer to a real implementation of the system
on distributed platforms. A representation of the dis-
tributed configuration is provided in Figure 10. One
sees that the unifying layer is the JADE platform that
can run distributed once the network layer is avail-
able. The only difference between the agents residing
in the platform is the presence in one machine of the
Exception Handling (EH) agent that has the task of
handling exception conditions and eventually restart
agents. For this purpose a set of identical HP DC7800
host machines have been used with the following char-
acteristics. The hardware is based on Intel Core2 Duo
E6550 @ 2.33GHz, with 2GB of RAM, 160GB of HDD
and gigabit ethernet. The operating system is Debian
GNU/Linux 6.0, kernel 2.6.32-5-686, and further soft-
ware is Eclipse version 3.5.2 Java EE IDE for Web De-
velopers, JADE version 4.1, and JRE version 1.6.0.24
with just-in-time compiler enabled.
Several parameters can be adjusted influencing the
agent decision, namely: (1) number of Ips used as thresh-
old in order to redirect the participant from one final
table to the other; (2) difference between starting prices
for the two kinds of sellers; (3) threshold switching val-
ues in the fuzzy logic block; (4) best way to assign values
to H, M and L final payoffs; (5) price dynamics from
one round to the other; (6) Gencos’ price penalties for
exceeding thresholds; (7) probability for a prosumer to
become more expensive than a Genco; and (8) accu-
racy about energy supply and demand forecasting that
might not be 100% correct.
The best way to give a precise value to these param-
eters is to study an analytical formulation in which we
can combine all the other known values (e.g., number
of participants and amount of demands and supplies)
in order to retrieve the unknown constants. However,
due to the complexity and dynamics of the proposed
model, we decided to use a numerical approach by try-
ing several value combinations of every input variables
of the algorithm.
At the end of each round, the buyer agent calculates
the average expecting budget and the average money
spent, assigning to each round number those other two
values (e.g., round #, Paid Price, Expected Price).
5 Evaluation via Simulation
In order to have a clearer idea of the efficiency and
precision of the strategy, we show the difference between
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Fig. 10 Distributed realization of the energy interaction platform.
applying the presented algorithm or use a baseline set of
actions. In the latter scenario, every buyer will contact
a prosumer straightaway, since their starting prices are
lower, becoming more appetizing to a rational agent. In
addition, after signing a contract, the participant does
not adjust any strategy parameter.
We obtain the results shown in Fig. 11, under the
following conditions: (1) intersection between average
starting prices of the sellers should not exceed 33%; (2)
slow and not exaggerated price swings between each
round; (3) significant price penalties for exceeding Gen-
cos’ threshold; (4) the higher the error percentage be-
tween the forecast demand values and the actual re-
quested values (negative error), the better becomes the
improvement between using the presented algorithm
compared to the baseline scenario; positive errors may
worsen participant performances; and (5) very fast re-
action to follow the expected price. The conditions (1)
and (3) force the gap between the prices to be wide
enough to justify the minority game approach, while
(2) and (5) deal with the difficulty of the algorithm
in finding equilibria in exaggerate dynamic scenarios.
While (4) is straightforward.
The results of the simulation, as depicted in Fig. 11,
show that expected prices follow the previous peak of
paid prices. It is important to highlight that we are
also trying to simulate the impact of swinging prices
due to raw material prices fluctuations and/or payback
costs for solar panels or wind turbines for prosumers.
Even if those swings are not exaggerated due to high
granularity for stipulating contracts, they are indeed
an additional challenge to further prove the reaching of
certain equilibrium scenarios. Proving the effectiveness
of the described game is a challenging open question
that we tried to answer with this simulation test.
In the simulation, the expected price starts from 0
in the first round, and the convergence between the ex-
pected price and the paid price starts in the range of
11th-21st round. Economically speaking, it means that
in earlier rounds a buyer agent adopting the algorithm
with the described strategies is likely to pay equally or
slightly more than an agent following other strategies.
However, if we consider a sufficiently large number of
rounds, the saving is guaranteed compared to agents
that always choose the strategy that immediately ap-
pears as the most convenient (Fig. 11).
As shown in the graph in Fig. 11, the gap between
the two situations (i.e., agents following the adaptive
strategy and agents always contacting cheaper sellers
first) is remarkable when certain conditions are satis-
fied. In addition to that, we can see how expected prices,
starting from very low (and impossible to obtain) values
tend to reach an equilibrium in the amount that repre-
sents the cheapest alternative in almost all the exam-
ined negotiation rounds. The prices obtained with the
proposed strategy follow really close that value. Op-
portunistic agents that always try to win prosumers’
auction may have some chance to win during the initial
rounds, but still the algorithm provided tries to estab-
lish a Nash equilibrium nonetheless; once the prices are
balanced, chances to obtain the best bargain are going
to be sporadic for those agents.
In the simulation, the expected price starts from 0 in
the first round, reaching a convergence during the 8th
round. Starting from that point, it becomes visible how
expected and obtained prices of agents that follows the
multi-stage minority game approach (represented by
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Fig. 11 Three functions showing the difference between no learning prices and the chasing of expected prices with obtained
average deals when using the explained strategy, considering 400 rounds.
the two continuous lines in Fig. 11), will constantly
chase each other. Economically speaking, it means that
in earlier rounds a buyer agent adopting the algorithm
with the described strategies is likely to pay equally or
slightly more than an agent following other strategies.
However, if we consider a sufficiently large number of
rounds, the saving compared to agents following the
baseline behavior (Fig. 11, the dotted line) is obtained
more frequently, with significant lowest peaks during
the most expensive period for buying energy.
The test was executed having a constant numbers
of agents, although sellers’ supply capacity was sub-
ject to randomized swings from one round to the other.
Therefore, changing sellers’ number does not drastically
affect the presented results, provided that this num-
ber does not exaggeratedly and unrealistically change
in a short period of time. In a more complex scenario
in which sellers adopt strategies according to the eco-
nomic background, the presence of market competitors
will determine an additional factor that needs to be
further investigated in order to provide a more realistic
model.
Computationally wise, the complexity of the pre-
sented algorithm is variable but does not appear to
represent a problem. While the balancer agent has the
duty to solve equation 5, buyer agents just have to solve
an iterated amount of conditional instruction and com-
paring variables (e.g: if the current Ip value is greater
than the threshold value then execute action A, other-
wise jump to action B). The fuzzy logic block is just
composed of a mixed set of linear functions and it is
executed just once at the end of the negotiating round.
Distributed environment
To test the scalability of the system in terms of the ob-
tainable performance compared to an environment with
Table 8 Scalability of the system till proper functioning.
Measured metric Distributed
case
Standalone
case
Number of hosts 6 1
Number of agents 818(600c,
140p, 60g, 6b,
6t, 6w)
243(180c, 42p,
18g, 1b, 1t,
1w)
Average number of
messages transferred
2865639 65439
Average time to reach
convergence
519800 ms 1879993 ms
Average CPU and
memory usage
46%, 566MB 39%, 667MB
Average CPU and
memory usage by
JADE
13%, 230MB 40%, 100MB
just one machine and one agent container, we distribute
the agent platform over several machines.
Table 8 shows the property of scalability of the dis-
tributed system versus a standalone system in their
maximal load configuration. The number of agents that
can be created on the two platforms grows a bit less
than linearly while maintaining similar performances.
For a number of agents that is more than triplicated
between the distributed and the standalone case, we
see an increase of the number of exchanged messages
that is more than one order of magnitude larger. This
high increase of the required communication is due to
the dynamics of the auction system. However, the dis-
tributed solution achieves a convergence of the system
almost three time faster than the standalone one.
Scalability of the distributed versus a standalone
system having the same number of agents participat-
ing in the trading is reported in Table 9. One can see
that the time to reach completion is more or less the
same in the first case, while for the distributed solution
the increase is sublinear, the standalone version expe-
riences a sharp increase in the time to reach comple-
tion of the auction process. This aspect is also reflected
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Table 10 Scalability of the system with increase of the host
resources.
Measured metric Test 1 Test 2 Test 3
Number of hosts 1 3 6
Number of agents 99(60c, 14p, 6g, 6b, 6t, 6w 1e)
Average number of
messages transferred
7851 5058 5470
Average time to reach
convergence
17562
ms
10569
ms
17113
ms
Average CPU and
memory usage
55%,
323MB
50%,
263MB
40%,
148MB
Average CPU and
memory usage by
JADE
22%,
111MB
32%,
118MB
39%,
115MB
in the amount of resources required in terms of CPU
and RAM. The performance of the distributed solution
is definitely a consistent improvement and proves that
the system has to be distributed in a solution similar
to real cases in terms of the parties involved.
The last scalability test deals with a solution where
we keep constant the number of agents involved and we
increase the available resources from 1 to 3 and finally
to 6 hosting machines. We see that the best results in
terms of required messages and time to reach conver-
gence of the problem is achieved with the platform with
3 hosts. The additional effort of a solution with 6 ma-
chines is due to the resources required by JADE to keep
the platform running in a consistent manner. One no-
tices that the use of the CPU is mostly dedicated to the
agent platform.
In general, the results of the scalability tests show
that having more platforms does provide for faster con-
vergence. However, as shown in Test 3, the optimum
does not always mean that the maximum number of
hosts have to be used. The over-distribution of the load
requires additional synchronization and consistency mes-
sages to be exchanged in the agent platform that have
an impact on the performance of the whole application.
Additional tests concerning the failure and recovery of
the application and its components in a distributed do-
main are reported in [26]. Finally, we remark as this is
just a way of test scalability. Our approach has been
that of simulating communities of agents (e.g. related
to microgrids) interacting. An alternative approach is
to test agents living in individual containers. We leave
such an approach for future research.
6 Related Work
Several topics contribute to the state of the art on which
the present work on service-orientation and the smart
grid is based on. Solutions that apply agents, game the-
ory, adaptation in the Smart Grid context are limited
so far. Usually, works focus on just one specific aspect of
the topic without taking in consideration all the aspects
arising in a prosumer-based energy landscape.
The Smart Grid is a very good example of an appli-
cation domain for SOAs. Although the Smart Grid is
not yet implemented, and the standardization process
is underway, several scientists advocate for SOAs as the
approach to deal with the complexity of the Smart Grid
environment. In [37] we outline the service requirements
for the future applications of the Smart Grid . We em-
phasize the use of services for weather, energy market
prices, and production of energy of small renewable-
based production units. The paper also shows how to re-
alize a simulation of the Smart Grid today with focus on
the aspects of the Smart Grid essential for the end user.
The proposed implementation uses some online services
provided on the Internet. The broader panorama of the
service approach to the Smart Grid is analyzed in [35].
The paper shows how services are required to cover the
many aspects and actors present in the new approach
to the electrical grid. The interoperation between many
systems, lots of them with a legacy heritage, is possi-
ble through the adaptation of the systems in a service-
oriented way. The paper also clearly explains the ad-
ditional challenges that a service-oriented architecture
in the power domain poses compared to the traditional
business process-oriented world. Cox and Considine [13]
stress how collaboration is the essential characteristic of
the Smart Grid. The interaction among the many actors
involved in the Smart Grid requires transparency, com-
position, extensibility and loose coupling. The authors
also identify the standards for information exchange
to be used in the Smart Grid for some aspects such
as scheduling and time functions, weather information,
device discovery and market interactions. All these el-
ements fit in a SOA framework. Collaboration between
future Smart Grid objects, appliances and devices in or-
der to achieve better energy management and efficiency
is the idea of [23]. The author envisions a collabora-
tion between different entities such as energy resources,
energy marketplaces, enterprises and energy providers
through Web services, since they enable flexible inte-
gration without the problems due to implementation
details. In Karnouskos’s vision device of the Smart Grid
will be SOA-ready exposing in a standard way the ser-
vices it can provide.
Looking more specifically at Smart Grid , many
works have the goal of realizing simulation software tak-
ing into account the scenarios that the future Grid will
enable. In [46], the authors simulate the effects of com-
bining households loads and electric vehicles to play the
buffer role in balancing a Grid mainly powered by so-
lar resources. The result is a reduction in the required
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Table 9 Scalability of the distributed vs. standalone system.
Measured metric Distributed
case 1
Standalone
case 1
Distributed
case 2
Standalone
case 2
Distributed
case 3
Standalone
case 3
Number of hosts 6 1 6 1 6 1
Number of agents 58(30c, 7p, 3g,
6b, 6t, 6w)
43(30c, 7p, 3g,
1b, 1t, 1w)
98(60c, 14p,
6g, 6b, 6t, 6w)
98(60c, 14p,
6g, 1b, 1t, 1w)
178(120c, 28p,
12g, 6b, 6t,
6w)
163(120c, 28p,
12g, 1b, 1t,
1w)
Average number of
messages transferred
4578 7124 7408 54578 28189 531730
Average time to reach
convergence
10871 ms 10486 ms 12148 ms 38076 ms 22583 ms 696450 ms
Average CPU and
memory usage
42%, 190MB 51%, 234MB 46%, 143MB 55%, 306MB 42%, 244MB 72%, 606MB
Average CPU and
memory usage by
JADE
36%, 100MB 25%, 71MB 32%, 113MB 27%, 77MB 25%, 132MB 18%, 95MB
spinning reserves (i.e., on-line extra generating capac-
ity) and the benefits in terms of reduction of CO2 emis-
sions. Another simulation tool for Smart Grid in general
with focus on the Demand-Response is provided in [51].
The presented system is basically a MATLAB simula-
tion that addresses mainly the electrical problems of
the Smart Grid and to a smaller extent the ICT and
communication aspects. An investigation that exploits
the principles of agents considering the wholesale elec-
tricity market and its prices is provided in [28]. The
main contribution of the paper is to simulate a mar-
ket with multiple participants with their own strategies
that have to take into account power line constraints
and generator constraints. Another simulation environ-
ment with the Smart Grid flavor is proposed in [44].
The paper focuses on a simulation of the residential
environment energy management, therefore the effects
inside the house of the Smart Grid. The main features
of the simulation are demand response with several de-
vices and scenarios considered (dishwasher, dryer, elec-
tric vehicle, refrigerator, etc.). From an economic point
there is no mention of tariff differentiation or energy ne-
gotiation, but the only aspect considered is a return on
investment analysis considering the cost of residential
energy management system and the savings in energy
costs obtained by the home intelligent equipment.
Software architectures in the picture of the future
Smart Grid is the focus of several researchers. The im-
portance of services and related architectures that can
handle such a scenario in the future Smart Grid is em-
phasized by Karnouskos in his vision paper [24]. The
author believes that services are the right choice in the
Smart Grid panorama give the heterogeneity and flexi-
bility required by the many actors involved. Also on the
architecture level of the future Smart Grid is the work
of Strobbe et al. . From a technical perspective the work
uses a java-based platform and protocols. Although the
platform is well described and sound, the services pro-
posed are mainly used to increase the level of aware-
ness of the users and stimulate them to save energy by
providing price signals. Such a mechanism is a form of
demand shape through prices that can help in shaving
the peaks and have a better user of renewable sources.
Another example of architecture for the Smart Grid is
proposed by Verschueren et al. [49]. The most interest-
ing aspect of the proposed architecture is the generality
in the purposes that it has by the ease in the addition of
new services. In the description proposed it can interact
and control Smart Grid-enabled devices; moreover, the
architecture can act also as a integration point for other
services provided by service-providers related to energy
such as real-time energy pricing and remote device con-
trol. Although this architecture is valuable and enables
a good simulation in the large of the Smart Grid, it lacks
in considering the prosumer interactions that are a key
ingredient for the future Smart Grid; for this purpose
we consider an agent-based system better suited. Web
services are the key components envisioned in the Smart
Grid as suggested in [25] and [2]. However, these works
are mainly a test related to web service interaction and
simulation of web services communication for instance
representing appliances and sensors. There is no men-
tion of agents and markets dynamics in such works. A
brief overview on the integration of Web services and
agents in the Smart Grid is presented in [54], in which
a generic overview on such integrated architectures is
presented, without detailing negotiations and market
aspects.
7 Conclusions
People will perceive the true benefits of the smart grid
only when the digitalization of the infrastructure will
deliver added valued services to them. Being able to
participate in an open deregulated energy markets has
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the potential of being one of such services. To enable it
though there are a number of technical challenges that
need to be addressed. Service-orientation and agent based
modeling promise to be the solution for the job. In the
present work, we proposed such an architecture and
we introduce an adaptive strategy at the system level,
based on minority games. Our strategy considers as-
pects of balancing and pricing, focusing in particular
on negotiation and adaptation to deregulated energy
market conditions.
To show the feasibility and soundness of the ap-
proach, we have implemented and tested the proposed
system. The results of the simulations show that the gap
between the two approaches (i.e., agents following the
proposed adaptive strategy and agents following a base-
line behavior) is remarkable when certain conditions are
satisfied. These conditions relates to remarkable differ-
ences between Genco’s prices (and related price penal-
ties) and Prosumers’ starting prices, but also to slow
oscillations of raw material prices among different nego-
tiation rounds, and proper tuning of all the parameters
involved in the simulation. In general, the average price
of our approach better suits the expected price than the
base approach. We remark also that expected prices,
starting from very low (and impossible to obtain) val-
ues, tend to reach a balanced amount that represents
the cheapest alternative in almost all the examined ne-
gotiation rounds. Additional tests should be executed
in a larger scale, involving real world data, and actu-
ally deployed service-oriented smart grids. However the
easiness by which agents can be dynamically added to
a service-oriented architecture promises to for scalable
solutions.
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